Sentence examples for material payoffs is from inspiring English sources

In Example 2, the outcome where the sum of the material payoffs is maximized is one of the sequential group reciprocity equilibria.

We generalize the circumstances in which the outcome where the sum of the material payoffs is maximized is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium.

This result is very optimistic as it concludes that in the outcome where the sum of the material payoffs is being maximized, nobody wants to deviate (even if they can increase their own material payoffs by doing it).

Proposition 3 shows that the outcome where the sum of material payoffs is maximized is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium as some individuals can greatly help their opponents without incurring a high cost to themselves.

Because players 1 and 4 are maximizing their opponents material payoffs and players 2 and 3 are maximizing their own material payoffs, the group fairness equilibrium of the two-period game is the outcome where the sum of the material payoffs is maximized.

Third, if the material payoffs of both games are sufficiently asymmetric (i.e., individuals can greatly reward or punish their opposing players with little cost to themselves), the outcome in which the sum of the material payoffs is maximized is a sequential group reciprocity equilibrium.

Proposition 4 shows that when the payoffs of the composite game are sufficiently asymmetric, the sequential group reciprocity equilibria are outcomes where the sum of the material payoffs are maximized.

In case of participation (m ∈ M ), the sum m is deducted from the consumerʼs material payoff (but is not transferred to the expert), and the expert is informed about the magnitude of the sum before making his provision and charging decision.

If the outcome of single game 2 is strictly negative, the emotions of fairness of every player will be strictly negative and no player would sacrifice their own material payoffs to be nice to their opponent, which would eliminate any strictly positive outcome for game 1 also.

For example, in the battle of the sexes, an individual cannot be kind to his or her opponent, given that when a person maximizes their opponent's material payoffs, they are maximizing their own material payoffs as well.

As Rabin (1993), we study games where the material payoffs may be arbitrarily small or arbitrarily large.