Carruthers (1998a,b, 2000) has argued to this effect based on his 'higher-order thought' theory, according to which, phenomenal consciousness requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one's own thoughts.[8] Such conceptualization requires, according to Carruthers, a theory of mind.
Mally's theory, however, requires an ontology with a sufficient number of properties enough to jointly determine all the conceptual objects we might use to cognize and conceptualize ordinary everyday objects.
Republicans should conceptualize and articulate every domestic policy with a single-minded focus on easing the ascent up the economic ladder.
Young writes that without doing so "it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process" (1997, 17).
A somewhat less idealized view of the constituency of public reason is offered by Gaus (2011), who suggests that we should conceptualize the members of this constituency he calls them Members of the Public as moderately idealized counterparts of the real people to whom our moral and political rules apply.
Practitioners of simulation, particularly in engineering contexts, in weapons testing, and in climate science, tend to conceptualize the EOCS in terms of verification and validation.
We ought therefore to conceptualize our possession of free will as an exemption from the laws of nature; the power of "doing and forbearing".
Think of immersing yourself in the colors and textures of a Van Gogh painting, for example, or the scene as you look out at your garden it would seem that one can be phenomenally conscious of a highly complex set of properties, which one could not even begin to describe or conceptualize in any detail.
While I will be emphasizing the local/global dichotomy, I hasten to add that there are other ways to conceptualize the major alternatives in the theory of mathematical explanation.
So it is no objection to representationalism that our pain experiences don't represent tissue damage as such, which is to say that we cannot necessarily conceptualize what pain experiences represent as tissue damage solely on the basis of these experiences.
Building on Young's insight, Suzanne Dovi (2009) has argued that we should not conceptualize representation simply in terms of how we bring marginalized groups into democratic politics; rather, democratic representation can require limiting the influence of overrepresented privileged groups.
