Sentence examples for worlds that differ from inspiring English sources

As a third main argument for primitivism, it has been argued that there are worlds that differ purely causally (Armstrong 1983, Tooley 1987, and Carroll 1994).

As Lewis (1986: 224) notes, PII-Objects leaves haecceitism untouched, since it is compatible with the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible worlds that differ haecceitistically.

In defending haecceitism, a natural strategy is to extend Black's case by arguing that, not only can we conceive of a world containing only two indiscernible iron spheres, we can conceive of distinct worlds that differ only insofar as these spheres swap their spatial locations.

Then, it can be argued, unless there are non-trivial individual essences, we are in danger of having to admit the existence of possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain.

It's safest to focus on situations that are very completely specified so we'll just say that no two possible worlds that differ in their ethical properties can be exactly alike in their descriptive properties.

He mentions that the psychologist Michael Woods believed that Blyton was different from many other older authors writing for children in that she seemed untroubled by presenting them with a world that differed from reality.

The results presented in this work show that the reaction networks of M. tuberculosis, M. leprae and E. coli are scale-free, small-world networks that differ significantly from random networks.

Given this definition and given two worlds, W1 and W2, that differ in that the persons in W1 are happier and more disposed to behave morally than are the persons in W2, with the result, let us suppose, that W1 is a better world than W2, it is clear that a gracious God would not love the persons in W1 more than the persons in W2.

C'mon, liberal HuffPo readers: indulge the essence of liberalism and show some tolerance for world views and cultures that differ from your own.

Non-Lewisian modal realists of this sort can therefore hold qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds to represent maximal possibilities that differ haecceitistically.

Additionally, there is a quidditistic analogue of cheap haecceitism, according to which a given possible world represents various maximal possibilities that differ only quidditistically.