"I inadvertently voted 'no' when I intended to vote 'yes,'" Mr. Gingrey told the House on Thursday.
He asked when I intended to lose my virginity and I said: "17", and he agreed this was the ideal age.
If I had left the office when I intended to, I should have spent five hours standing up in a crowded subway train, somewhere between Times Square and 86th Street, and been rescued by firemen with flashlights.
More telling, perhaps, is the possibility of making a mistake, as when I intend to walk home by the shortest possible route, but have taken a wrong turn.
For some, the settling condition implies belief: the sense in which I'm settled on A-ing when I intend to A entails that I believe that I will A (Harman 1976, Velleman 1989).
Although we sometimes report intention as a propositional attitude—'I intend that p' such reports can always be recast as 'intending to…' as when I intend to bring about that p. By contrast, it is difficult to rephrase such mundane expressions as 'I intend to walk home' in propositional terms.
When I intend to do A in the future, I am doing something now with the intention of doing A, in that I intend, of what I am doing, that it promote or constitute my doing A. The action in question may be overt, but it may be as minimal as keeping track of opportunities for doing A, or biding my time.
Doubts about this entailment are attributed to ambiguities in 'desire.' When I intend to do A reluctantly, from the motive of duty, I may deny that I want to do it, but what I lack is 'appetite' not 'volition' (Davis 1984, pp. 135 40; Thompson 2008, pp. 103 5).
Philosophical perplexity about intention begins with its appearance in three guises: intention for the future, as when I intend to complete this entry by the end of the month; the intention with which someone acts, as I am typing with the further intention of writing an introductory sentence; and intentional action, as in the fact that I am typing these words intentionally.
Similarly, it has been suggested that there is an important difference between hypothetical norms involving ordinary non-normative facts (such as facts about the weather) and norms involving meaning facts: Since meaning facts are constituted by correctness conditions, meaning facts always dictate how I should behave when I intend to produce a meaningful utterance.
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