Sentence examples for weak necessity from inspiring English sources

The statement may enjoy a stronger necessity, too, which would render it true in all worlds, period.[1] In this entry, "necessity" is to be understood as weak necessity (at least).

Let us suppose that the relation obtaining at a world W between the mental and the physical is one of weak necessity as just defined; that is, suppose that, at W, the mental is necessitated by the physical but only if certain blockers are absent.

For if the relation of the mental to the physical that obtains at W is one of weak necessity, then not only is physicalism false but it is also false that any world which is a physical duplicate of W is a positive duplicate of W — at some physical duplicate worlds, for example, there will be no psychological properties at all.

Some ancient commentators took this to mean that Aristotle operated with a distinction between strong essential per se necessities and weak accidental necessities in the sense of non-essential invariances, such as inseparable accidents (see also Porphyry, Isagoge 3.5 6), and that this distinction played an important role in his modal syllogistic.

For another thing, if we accept both Weak Reasons Necessity and Weak Reasons Sufficiency, then repeated applications of these principles may imply that if there is reason for something, then there is reason for everything.

To them, vegans are still skinny and weak, by necessity.

The weakest requirement imposed on a necessity-like modal operator $\Box$ in systems of classical modal logic is the congruence property: \[\mathord{\vdash A \leftrightarrow B} \slashrel \mathord{\vdash \Box A \leftrightarrow \Box B}\] ("if $A \leftrightarrow B$ is provable, then so is $\Box A \leftrightarrow \Box B$").

Some of those problems concern the allegedly implausible consequences that emerge when we apply some of the transmission principles we discuss in §2 above specifically, Ought Necessity, Weak Reasons Necessity, and Weak Reasons Sufficiency to the relevant wide-scope ought in certain cases.

There are stronger and weaker brands of necessity corresponding to the possible notions of rigidity.

Ordinary prosecutors, of necessity, drop weak cases and pursue only the stronger ones; independent counsels may, even feel they must, carry on regardless.

This is an argument against Strong Reasons Necessity and Weak Reasons Necessity.