Suvorexant advocates suggests that there is a qualitative difference between suvorexant antagonizing wakefulness whereas in contrast, competitive hypnotics promote sleep, but I cannot conceptualize this distinction clearly.
Indeed, it was correctly used when the child was able to attribute an adequate label to the emotion, while when the child cannot conceptualize the emotion, the arousal value seems to be more ambiguous (for example for disgust) or less relevant (sadness).
So it is no objection to representationalism that our pain experiences don't represent tissue damage as such, which is to say that we cannot necessarily conceptualize what pain experiences represent as tissue damage solely on the basis of these experiences.
If colors are (at least, partly) objective features of surfaces like their surface spectral reflectances, our visual experiences don't represent colors as such, so we cannot come to conceptualize colors as spectral reflectances on the basis of their "grainless" visual presentations.
If Hemingway's writing is algebraic in its precision, then Wallace's is quantum calculus, a discipline that taxes the imagination by asking us to conceptualize things we cannot see, like the the way a function shows change through space and time.
The examples given are "windlessness" (nênemia), which is defined as "stillness [the form] in a quantity of air [the matter]," and "calm-on-the-ocean" (galênê), which is defined as "levelness [the form] of sea [the matter]." The terms form and matter are Aristotle's, and we cannot be sure how Archytas conceptualized the two parts of his definitions.
The importance of explanations at the level of complex structures is not disputed, but whether these represent just ways of conceptualizing a fundamental level which we cannot normally access, is another matter.
The way we label, conceptualize, judge, control, calculate, and define.
How do we heuristically conceptualize segregation?
