The implication is that cogito, like 2+3=5, is something to which we cannot but assent while attending clearly and distinctly, but which we can later doubt in moments of epistemic pessimism, when no longer attending clearly and distinctly.
The cogito initially establishes merely that we cannot but assent to our existence; the stronger, metaphysical result is established only upon demonstrating the veracity of clear and distinct perception.
When we hold a self-evident truth, our wills are compelled by the clarity and distinctness of the idea: we "see" the truth so clearly and distinctly that we cannot doubt it; that is, we cannot but assent to it.
According to Sextus, they assented to the claim that we cannot have knowledge of what I have called EI-type propositions although it is far from clear that this was an accurate description of their views.
Although taste responds to real qualities of objects, we cannot replace the exercise of taste with the assent of reason.
What underlies this form of skepticism is assent to the proposition that we cannot know EI-type propositions because our evidence is inadequate.
But recall that what distinguishes the Academic Skeptic from the Pyrrhonian Skeptic is that only the Academic Skeptic assents to the claim that we cannot have knowledge.
We acquire the views we hold by assenting to impressions; in every given case, we can assent to an impression, negate it, or withhold judgment.
Moreover, since they are not within the spectrum of epistemic evaluation, we cannot opine regarding them, for opinion [Meinung], as Kant understands the term, is a mode of assent based upon the weighing of theoretical grounds (evidence and argument) for and against truth.
If we cannot contact a next of kin within 48 hours of initial screening we will contact a professional consultee for assent (professional consultees will be defined as a senior member of the clinical care team who is not directly involved in the research or patient's care).
