But until we understand animals as moral agents in and of themselves, they will be nothing more than distant recipients of our largesse.
We can identify them as moral agents even though we generally do not hold them morally responsible, according to Floridi and Sanders: they are the source of a moral action and can be held morally accountable by correcting or punishing them.
If there's something missing from these approaches to violence, it's attention to first-person attitudes, how we think about ourselves as moral agents.
At a personal level, Dawkins believes that whatever the evolutionary processes that have brought us where we are, we have a responsibility to act as moral agents.
In Part III, Other Reflections, Korsgaard takes up question how we come to view one another as moral agents in Hume's philosophy.
But it is not clear that likeness is strong enough to sustain the nature of these groups as moral agents of the kind that we normally associate with moral responsibility.
And how can we have meaningful "character talk" when including oppressed people and people of color as moral agents, as agents of change even, while evading the potential for the demeaning, pejorative conversations that respectability politics spews out.
Is it possible for groups, as distinct from their members, to be morally blameworthy for bringing about harm? to be guilty as moral agents?
Thus many philosophers consider humans the only creatures capable of acting as moral agents.
Regardless, it should be up to college students as moral agents to decide for themselves.
When men acted as moral agents, conflict ceased, and their aims coincided.
