Plantinga intuits that warrant cannot be initially generated merely by means of warrant transfer.
In our two-belief case, I supposed both beliefs were initially (independently of any warrant transfer) just short of being sufficiently warranted.
Here it's important not to be misled by the term "warrant transfer," which to the ears of most of us suggests that the transferrer loses what it transfers to the receiver of the transfer.
(If transferers didn't lose what they transfer, then one suspects that bank transfers would be a whole lot more popular!) That's not how it works in warrant transfer among beliefs.
Whether those damages would be sufficient to warrant transfer of the microprocessor will be determined in the next phase of the arbitration, which will deal with remedies, he said.
Take a case of simple, one-way inference (you know, the kind of basing foundationalists like): C is sufficiently warranted, you notice it implies D, and infer D from C. D becomes warranted (perhaps sufficiently so) by virtue of warrant transfer from C, but C's level of warrant is not thereby reduced (and certainly is not reduced by as much as D's level of warrant in increased).
Here, the immediate warrant can fall well short of being sufficient, and yet the beliefs comprising the system may end up being sufficiently warranted, because of the warrant they transfer (without losing) to one another.
In general, therefore, a careful analysis of the prevailing industry structures is warranted when transferring the IÖW model to other countries.
Notice, however, that this is inessential to the case, especially where you get a large system of beliefs, each of which has immediate warrant, and enters into partial basing relations with many of the others (so that each can receive warrant from several other beliefs without any of those others losing the warrant they transfer).
That means that the authorities will need to obtain a governor's warrant to transfer him out of state, a process that Mr. Craig said could take one to three weeks.
