The semantic view of theories (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980, Giere 1988, Suppe 1989, and Suppes 2002) reverses this standpoint and declares that we should dispense with a formal calculus altogether and view a theory as a family of models.
Briefly, on the semantic view, a theory is characterized by (1) some set of models and (2) the hypotheses linking these models with idealized physical systems.
If we call his view a "theory" of experience, we should be aware that from his standpoint the theory is a natural outgrowth of unitary experience and not a reflection on it as proceeding from a different source.
On this view a theory that does not present law as an exercise in constructive interpretation cannot even compete as a theory of law, because it suffers from the semantic sting.
Accordingly, on this sort of view, a theory of law aims to provide an account of the conditions under which the target concept of law (or one of its cognates) applies.
When this occurs, there is incommensurability; or as Feyerabend later characterized his view: "a theory is incommensurable with another if its ontological consequences are incompatible with the ontological consequences of the latter" (1981a, xi).
Quantum mechanics is, on this view, a theory about the possible statistical distributions of outcomes of certain measurements, and its non-classical 'logic' simply reflects the fact that not all observable phenomena can be observed simultaneously.
But, ironically, students are not likely to change their views of a theory until they have sufficient knowledge to do so.
Approximately 40 000 clinic patients either viewed a theory-based intervention video while in the waiting room, or not; selection was based on their clinic visit date.
He also very briefly mentions two unattributed realist views, a maneries theory and another form of status realism.
Your view was a theory, which was however not presented as a theory but as a near certainty.
