Putnam's goal in this section of his paper is to show that indeterminacy of reference leads to an indeterminacy in truth value for sentences like V=L that, in his words, these sentences "have no determinate truth value … they are just true in some intended models and false in others".
Lewis (1980) claims that the primary task of semantics is to describe how semantic values of sentences determine truth-values at contexts and circumstances of evaluation, the latter of which Lewis calls 'indices'indices
And the delays undermine whatever deterrent or retributive value death sentences are supposed to provide, as a penalty carried out several decades after the crime is unlikely to serve as a warning to others or to offer much solace to the victim's family.
He contemplated the semantical value of sentences about the contingent future, as discussed in Aristotle's De interpretatione.
We could allow the revision rule only to specify the value of sentences, allowing nonsentences to be in our out of the extension of T, willy-nilly.
In subsequent discussion it became clear, not that this criticism is definitely mistaken, but that it is difficult to determine what the truth value of sentences involving referential failure actually is.
RTT seeks, more specifically, to give a a two-valued account that assigns stable classical truth values to sentences when intuitive reasoning would assign stable classical truth values.
On Kaplan's theory, we can speak not only of the truth-values of propositions at worlds, but also of the truth-values of sentences at pairs of worlds and contexts.
Namely, he points out a strong analogy between extensions of predicators and truth values of sentences.
Or one could extract three semantic values for sentences: categorical truth, categorical falsehood, and uncategoricalness.
