These associations and the attitudinal positions they invoke are thus ultimately a function of intertextuality, in the broadest sense of the term i.e. in the sense which underlies Bakhtin's much quoted dictum that 'Each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other utterances to which it is related by the communality of the sphere of speech communication' (Bakhtin 1986: 91).
And Elizabeth Gaskell patronisingly explained that she wrote Mary Barton as an attempt "to give some utterance to the agony which, from time to time, convulses this dumb people".
The linguistic thesis is, roughly, that already expressed above, according to which utterances of sentences of the discourse are best seen not as efforts to say what is literally true, but as useful fictions of some sort.
In this work, following Wittgenstein and the members of the Vienna Circle, Ayer defended a verificationist theory of meaning (also called the verifiability principle), according to which an utterance is meaningful only if it expresses a proposition the truth or falsehood of which can be verified (at least in principle) through experience.
Consequently, Bar-On advocates, instead, what she calls a neo-expressivist view according to which expressive utterances can share logical and semantic structure with non-expressive utterances, despite the epistemic differences between them.
Permissivists of various stripes have defended views according to which ordinary utterances about how many things there are still manage to come out true.
Understood in this way, non-naturalism is a form of moral realism and is opposed to non-cognitivist positions according to which moral utterances serve to express non-cognitive attitudes rather than beliefs that provide their truth conditions and is also opposed to error-theoretical positions according to which there are no moral facts.
(It should be noted that this is similar to Kaplan's argument for why sentences-in-context, as opposed to utterances, which are concrete events, should be the primary bearers of semantic contents. See Kaplan 1977).
According to this 'poverty of the stimulus' argument, the examples of speech to which children are exposed do not contain enough evidence to settle which utterances are grammatical in the language they are trying to acquire.
The intellective power or intendimento of the intelligences moves Dante to an utterance which only these same powers can fully understand.
