There would probably be some indeterminacy of reference, so that each such utterance referred ambiguously to many different candidates.
Listeners frequently found it difficult to judge the meaning and intention of utterances referring to suicide.
According to his revisionist view of personal pronoun use, first-person thoughts and utterances refer only to persons, not to animals.
More recently, Robert Howell (2002a, 2002b) has argued that if the term 'work of art' covers artistic improvisations, the various utterances referred to as 'oral literature', and such items as paintings and scored musical compositions, then no single adequate ontological category is to be found.
In American jurisprudence, there is a tradition of recognizing spontaneous utterances referred to as res gestae admissions.
The first score is the total number of utterances referring to emotional levels 1,2, or 3 (implicit and explicit emotions).
For instance, the meaning of 'I' is arguably the speaker of this utterance and refers to that individual; the meaning of 'now' is arguably the time of this utterance and refers to that time.
Instead, he must have uttered a sentence that "samesays" the utterance demonstratively referred to.
Given a context c = <s, p, t> where s is the speaker, p the place, and t the time of utterance, then 'I' refers to s, 'here' to p, and 'now' to t.
Marga Reimer (1991a, 199b) argues that demonstrative utterances can refer to objects that are not the targets of the speaker's directing intentions, contrary to what she takes Kaplan (1989b) to be arguing.
