Then, we formulate and solve a Stackelberg game for the communication scenario described in Section 2.2 with the primary license holder and secondary users as leader and followers of the Stackelberg game, respectively.
The primary and secondary users are leader and follower, respectively, in a Stackelberg game, and the follower will control the game by advertising its strategy (Fig. 1) to the follower.
We also study a Stackelberg competition with primary users as leaders and investigate the impact of multiple leaders by modeling the wireless channel as an M/D/1 queue.
Migration and globalisation mean that we all encounter the full range of religious beliefs – and non-beliefs – in everyday life, as voters, volunteers, service users, partners, leaders, and educators.
They still number less than 10% of service users, and leaders must learn more about how and when the system of direct payments has worked to help design a new system for the future.
We have formulated a Stackelberg game in which the primary license holder and secondary user are leader and follower, respectively, and studied how the leader can influence the follower's decision of participating in the game by varying the cost function.
In this paper, we investigate a Stackelberg competition with the primary user as leader and find that in the Stackelberg game, the leader can improve its utility by influencing the follower's decision using its advertised cost function and the number of followers accepted into the network.
In our Stackelberg game, in order to have a stable queue, the validity and stability of spectrum sharing assessed via the M/D/1 queuing system needs to be investigated in terms of the number of primary and secondary users as leaders and followers, respectively.
Fig. 1 Queuing model of primary user as a leader and secondary user as a follower in Stackelberg game.
For this set of analyses, there is only one primary user as a leader, and the number of secondary users varies from 1 to 20.
