Can any problems with the proximate-ultimate dichotomy be resolved merely by changing terms?
Both Watt and Calcott draw attention to additional problems with the proximate-ultimate dichotomy.
We will illustrate our concern that the proximate-ultimate dichotomy blinkers thinking with two examples, one Gardner's and the other from Dickins and Barton's writings.
The primary problem with the proximate-ultimate dichotomy is not that it is ambiguous, but that it channels thinking, leading to the neglect of alternative hypotheses.
The second illustration of how the proximate-ultimate dichotomy makes communication difficult can be found in Dickins and Barton's treatment of developmental bias.
Thus our rejection of the proximate-ultimate dichotomy is a repudiation of Mayr's equation of development with the solely proximate, and subsequent insistence that development is irrelevant to evolution.
Watt's subtle analysis is a strong counter-perspective to Dickins and Barton, who seem to think that a rejection of the proximate-ultimate dichotomy implies a failure to distinguish between evolution and development.
We have argued that Mayr's proximate-ultimate causation dichotomy is problematic.
Yet we think there is something more here: specifically, that the proximate-ultimate causation dichotomy encourages a unidirectional view of biological causation, where development is viewed as the outcome rather than the cause of evolution.
These include problems with both the term 'ultimate causation' and the proximate-ultimate causation dichotomy more generally, clarification of the meaning of reciprocal causation, discussion of issues related to the nature of development and phenotypic plasticity and their roles in evolution, and consideration of the need for an extended evolutionary synthesis.
