Misconceptions associated with evolution intentionality subscribe a type of conscious will and directive to the mechanisms of evolution.
Scientists have long believed that the animals aren't capable of the same type of conscious thought we are because they fail the "emotional fever" test.
Arguably, for these thinkers, every type of conscious experience has its distinctive phenomenal character, its "phenomenology" — and the task of phenomenology (the discipline) is to analyze that character.
The first experiment aimed at ascertaining whether our claim that OT and illusion strength correlate in healthy subjects could be confirmed, even without first suggesting to the participants what type of conscious content was under investigation.
In the late 1990s, Roy Baumeister (a professor at Florida State University) and colleagues performed several experiments showing that certain types of conscious mental actions appeared to draw from the same "energy source" — gradually diminishing our ability to make smart decisions throughout the day.
The names for these types of conscious acts derive not from a psychological theory, but from the analytic process of classifying acts in exchanges.
Seeing a color, hearing a tone, smelling an odor, feeling a pain — these types of conscious experience have a phenomenal character, but no others do, on this view.
However they do correlate to some extent with types of conscious processing described in Edelman's (1992) evolutionary theory of embodied consciousness, including perception, attention, memory (knowledge), concept formation (conception), value systems (attitude, engagement), planning (anticipation).10.10
Seeing that yellow canary, hearing that clear Middle C on a Steinway piano, smelling the sharp odor of anise, feeling a pain of the jab of the doctor's needle in receiving an injection — these types of conscious experience have a character of what-it-is-like, a character informed by conceptual content that is also "felt", on this view.
A number of previous fMRI and PET studies have begun to investigate the possible function of the DMN by examining correlations between brain activity and different types of conscious experiences.
This dual-choice format does not permit to clearly distinguish between mind-wandering, external distractions, and task-related interferences, such that these three types of conscious experiences might have been mixed into the same response category [9], [16].
