We consider a general scheme to construct Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms using a suitable 'variable mechanism parametrization.' The key idea is to perturb a given direct mechanism, which might not be truth revealing, introducing sufficient variability as a function of agents' announcements to generate incentives for truthful revelation.
Lawmakers interested in re-election have little incentive to be truthful about what implied guarantees of powerful companies will cost the taxpayer.
The extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanisms reinforce truthful feedbacks and achieve optimal welfare.
We propose a wage-based incentive mechanism for enforcing truthful report for non-verifiable information in self-interested P2P networks.
While these approaches characterize ways to break the problem of price-induced herding of loads, they do not characterize appropriate incentive structures that induce truthful behavior of system participants.
Recent theoretical work has shown that when information signals are not conditionally independent, prediction markets may not necessarily provide incentives for immediate and truthful revelation of information [20].
The recruitment and management of juries is a principal agent problem involving the design of incentive mechanisms for participation and truthful revelation of values.
The O-VCG auction minimizes the total transportation cost (i.e., allocative efficiency) and induces truthful bidding from carriers (i.e., incentive compatibility).
Among other statements, we prove that the weaker incentive compatibility property of truthfulness in expectation in our mechanism is necessary; universally truthful mechanisms that have an inclusion-maximality property have an approximation ratio of at least 2.
To examine incentive properties of the procedure, an assumption of truthful revelation of preferences is omitted.
