Sentence examples for truth-conditional semantics from inspiring English sources

According to many theorists, including the American philosopher Donald Davidson, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to its truth conditions (see semantics: truth-conditional semantics).

Tuomela (1973, Ch. V) defends a position that he calls semantic realism and that retains standard truth-conditional semantics.

From this it follows that, in standard truth-conditional semantics, the truth-value of φ is dependent on the semantic value of t.

Davidson uses Tarski's theory as a framework for a truth-conditional semantics for natural language.

But how can such a truth-conditional semantics explain the phenomena for which Frege invoked the notion of sense?

In this seminar we will consider whether vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to the dominant framework for natural language semantics, truth-conditional semantics.

The phenomenon of semantic implicature (Gricean conventional implicature) shows further that standard truth conditional semantics does not exhaust semantics.

Implicature is important even in truth conditional semantics.

In fact, as further specification of the format will show, what dynamic semantics provides is a generalization of truth conditional semantics rather than a radically different alternative.

Davidson's and Quine's accounts of radical interpretation/translation thus indirectly rest on the endorsement of a kind of truth conditional semantics.

A second possible misunderstanding is that dynamic semantics or update semantics is in complete opposition to classical truth conditional semantics (compare the entries on classical logic and first-order model theory).