Abstractive cognitions, by contrast, are not such as to naturally cause true judgements about contingent matters.[46] Ockham's ethics combines a number of themes.
An indefinite proposition is said to be true if it yields a true proposition (Łukasiewicz says 'judgement' for a definite proposition) for all values of its variables, it is false if it yields a false judgement for all values, and is neither true nor false if it yields true judgements for some values and false judgements for others.
Much has been written, on the other hand, about Ockham's distinctive thesis about the (supernatural) possibility of intuiting non-existing beings (in which case the relevant intuitive cognition would cause, he thinks, the true judgement that the intuited thing does not exist); see in particular Panaccio and Piché [2010].
Ockham's main point here is that an intuitive cognition naturally causes in the mind a number of true contingent judgements about the external thing(s) that caused this intuitive cognition; for example, that this thing exists, or that it is white, and so on.
Intuitive cognitions, on the other hand, can sometimes induce false beliefs, too, if the circumstances are abnormal (in cases of perceptual illusions in particular), but even then, they would still cause some true contingent judgements.
But as he became impressed by the argument that, for example, neither the judgement nor the proposition that Sam is sad employ the concept of state of affairs (or the concept of truth) he came round to the view that obtaining states of affairs make propositions true and judgements correct but are not properly speaking represented by these.
A lack of preparedness for the role of a substitute decision-maker, and a lack of clear understanding of using true substituted judgement [ 26, 27], (whereby the surrogate is responsible for making the medical decision that the patient would have made), further increases the risk for irresolvable conflict to lead to an impasse.
Although this anti-psychological approach is widely accepted today, there is still an open question concerning the order of explanation: Are beliefs and judgements true because they are directed at true propositions, or should we say that propositions (and sentences) are true because they express true beliefs and judgements?
In the first rule of the unfinished Rules for the Direction of the Mind, he states: "The aim of our studies should be to direct the mind with a view to forming true and sound judgements about whatever comes before it" (AT X 359/CSM I 9).
In contemporary terms, Brentano's strategy may be reconstructed as defining truth along deflationist lines, while proposing an epistemic criterion for separating true and false judgements (see Parsons 2004).
A more favorable reading of Brentano would grant that the problem of true negative existential judgements requires a special treatment, but allow that such treatment can be given within the confines of Brentano's theory.
