After 9/11, this manifested itself as what journalist Ron Suskind described as "the One Percent doctrine" or the "Cheney doctrine," the notion that even a very slight chance of catastrophe must be treated "as a certainty," and preëmpted.
Initially this process is probabilistic, meaning that what text is labeled as important data is a matter of confidence and likelihoods, but once that data is extracted, it's effectively treated as a certainty.
The latter is a logic where a 1% chance of harm must be treated as a certainty in a potential high-magnitude, low-probability future where you cannot wait until a threat materializes, where firm evidence of either intent or capability is too high a threshold (Suskind 2007; Anderson 2010; Daase 2011).
If the maximum of the three probabilities at a locus was higher than 0.9, we treated it as a certainty.
In November , 2001 Suskind writes, Vice-President Dick Cheney announced that if there was "a one percent chance" that a threat was real "we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response".
The title was drawn from an assessment by then-Vice President Dick Cheney, who, in the face of concerns that a Pakistani scientist was offering nuclear-weapons expertise to Al Qaeda, reportedly declared: "If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response".
Dick Cheney advocated his 1% Doctrine that, if there is a 1% chance of a major terrorist attack, we have to treat it as a certainty with an overwhelming response.
If there's a 1percentt chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.
If there's a chance--a small chance, the likelihood of which such people inflate by large multiples--that they might come face to face with an armed criminal, they treat it as a certainty.
Not [as in] Ron Suskind's book The One Percent [Doctrine where he claimed that Dick Cheney, after 9/11, asserted that "If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty"].
Networks were delineated with 95% certainty, with gaps treated as a fifth state.
