Sentence examples for treated intensions from inspiring English sources

All treated intensions functionally.

Semantic interpretations of the 2D framework, in contrast, treat the intensions picked out by the diagonal of a 2D matrix as basic semantic values in their own right.

Moreover, if we take propositions to be functions from possible worlds to truth-values (i.e., intensions of sentences), then we can easily treat the intension of a noun phrase as its compositional contribution to the proposition expressed by a sentence.

This seems to transpose the identity conditions for sets into an appropriately intensional key, and this is precisely how identity conditions for properties work in accounts that treat them as intensions (as functions from possible worlds to sets of objects therein) (Montague 1974).

Perhaps the best known account (emerging from the work of Carnap [1947] and Church [1951]) treats sense as intension.

RCT randomozed controlled trial; ITT intension to treat.

These patients will be considered as part of the amlodipine arm during analysis (intension to treat).

Continued divergence of overall survival (OS) curves in the intension to treat (ITT) population, with the survival advantage persisting beyond median survival time, suggested subpopulations might have different magnitudes of survival gain.

While a difference in 28-day mortality was suggested by the data, an intension to treat analysis was not performed and infectious morbidity and hospital length of stay were not reported.

For example, semantic accounts that employ intensions would most naturally treat 'lasted a fortnight' and 'lasted two weeks' as having the same meaning (since they have the same intension), which makes it difficult for such accounts to explain how 'Tom believes the battle lasted two weeks, but does not believe that it lasted a fortnight' could be true.

If we treat common natures and particular things as the intension and extension of terms, respectively, we come very close to Burley's account, with the possible exception of the ontological status of intensions (if we are 'nominalists'), since Burley regards both common natures and particular things as entities in the world.