Sentence examples for totality state of from inspiring English sources

Take the totality state of affairs that comprises all the (1st order) state of affairs.

By AW3R, [Water,s] (together with its totality state of affairs) itself constitutes a (very sparse) possible world w.

Keller (2007; 2009, 125 126) argues, more ominously, that the idea of a totality state of affairs is paradoxical and, hence, that such states of affairs simply cannot exist.

A bit more specifically, Armstrong (2004, 74) takes a totality state of affairs to be a higher-order atomic state of affairs of the form [Tot,T,being a state of affairs], where T is a sum of states of affairs — intuitively, the state of affairs that the sum in question is a totality with regard to the property in question.

In a similar way Armstrong endeavours to sweep away the need for negative facts by affirming "the biggest totality state of all, the one embracing all lower-order states of affairs", i.e., the existence of a totality state that consists in an aggregate of all the (1st order) states of affairs there are related by T to the property of being a (1st order) states of affairs (2004: 75).

However, the argument involves the assumption that if there are totality states of affairs, then they, too, form a totality.

Totality states of affairs and so-called law states of affairs, among others, are "higher-order" for Armstrong, insofar as they involve properties of, or relations among, properties.

Heil (2007) argues cogently that the perceived need for totality states of affairs is a confusion based upon a "shady 'linguisticizing' tendency to conflate features of descriptions and features of what is described" (ibid., 233).

But, as Armstrong (2007) points out in a reply to Keller, it seems quite consistent to accept the existence of totality states of affairs and deny that they jointly constitute a further totality, much in the way that ZF set theory denies that the sets jointly constitute a further set.

Typically, truthmaker maximalists will introduce states of affairs or facts to serve as the required truthmakers: totality states of affairs can serve as truthmakers for negative existentials (see Armstrong 2004: 72 5); the state of affairs of the ball's being red, not the red ball itself, is the truthmaker for 'the ball is red' (see Armstrong 1997 115 66).

So there must be a further totality state that comprised the aggregate of all of them.