At stake is what it means to commit oneself: to a person, a place, a moral imperative.
But justice requires not so much sentimentalism but a constant perseverance to commit oneself to the common good.
To take seriously the awareness of a categorical imperative to act rightly is to commit oneself to work for an ideal state of affairs in which perfect goodness and happiness coincide.
But Mr. Crouch was not simply seeking endorsement from the crowd; he was seeking souls for his Lord and to answer "yeah" was to commit oneself to something larger than a memorable concert.
To adopt the models is simply to suppose that observable events and states of affairs are as if the models were true, but there is no need to commit oneself to the existence of the unobservable entities and processes that figure in the models.
To commit oneself to anything is also always to commit oneself to the value of freedom.
In ordinary parlance, to be resolved is to commit oneself to some project and thus, in a sense, to take ownership of one's life.
For Habermas, this principle follows from the presuppositions of rational moral discourse, and so at least on one interpretation to engage in reasoned moral or political argument with others is to commit oneself to something like the idea of public reason to commit oneself to finding norms that could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.
One recent suggestion is that although a commitment to the existence of fusions is not ontologically innocent, it almost is: to commit oneself to fusions is to commit oneself to further entities, but because they are not fundamental entities they are not ones that matter for the purpose of theory choice (Cameron 2014, Schaffer 2008, Williams 2010, and see also Hawley 2014).
For now, it is the willingness to commit oneself to caring for parents' well-being, not necessarily the observable filial actions, that has been regarded by both generations as the priority of being filial.
To say that something is a matter of thick luck is to say this and to commit oneself to a certain account of the non-moral properties in virtue of which this moral relationship obtains.
