More generally, the objection is that the threshold conception is under-inclusive in interpreting which acts we consider harmful.
For example, the threshold conception allows for the possibility of discontinuities in degrees of moral status that might seem arbitrary.
According to the threshold conception of a Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities view, any being that meets the threshold has full moral status.
The response to the 'Non-Identity-Problem' based on the threshold conception is relevantly different from other responses (such as those criticized by Heyd in 2009b).
And so, combining this interpretation of the threshold conception with a Sophisticated Cognitive Capacity account results in not according all cognitively unimpaired adult humans equal moral status – a problem from the commonsense viewpoint.
According to the "commonsense view," a virtue of the threshold conception of the Sophisticated Cognitive Capacity account is that it distinguishes and elevates the moral status of cognitively unimpaired adult humans compared to other animals.
And so, if one accepts the claim that the capacity to do an activity well leads to even higher moral status, then one must reject the equal wrongness thesis and the threshold conception of 4.1.
If C is not only sufficient but necessary for FMS, then all beings lacking C would not have FMS, though the threshold conception would nevertheless leave it open whether having some other feature (e.g., parts of C or something lesser but akin to C) might ground lesser degrees of moral status.
According to the threshold conception, as it is usually discussed, if capacity C grounds FMS, then any being that has C, regardless of how well it can exercise this capacity, has as much moral status as any other being that has C and this status is full.
While both threshold and scalar conceptions of moral status allow for degrees of moral status, each faces its own set of difficulties.
