Furthermore, as was noted in the discussion of concepts, the contents of thoughts and representations need not always be fully conceptual: an infant seeing a triangle might deploy a representation with the nonconceptual content of a triangle, even though he does not possess the full concept as understood by a student of geometry.
That is, there is no logical "third realm," but merely a single process called "thinking [Denken];"[90] it is an immediately given fact of thinking that there are logical laws that stand over against all our other thoughts and representations as norms (L I: 76).
Following Said, this study aims to critique dominant Western systems of thought and representations in order to show how racism has become entrenched in Western society and how racial inequality still pervades Western discourse, in this case French discourse.
Some intentionalists, like Fred Dretske (1995) and Michael Tye (1995), think that whereas thoughts and propositional attitudes are mental representations with conceptual content, qualia or conscious experiences are mental representations with nonconceptual content (about which see Dretske 1981, Peacocke 1992, 2001 and the essays in Crane 1992).
Just as early chemists did not have a clue about the complexities that would eventually emerge about the nature of these atoms, so cognitive scientists probably do not have more than very general ideas about the character of the computations and representations that human thought actually involves.
It will mostly be concerned with thoughts, and not directly with linguistic representations, though, of course, a proponent of this conception can claim that there is a very close connection between them.
Time is the inner sense that animates existence, not just our thoughts and feelings, but the spatial representations we experience from birth until death.
My own thoughts and feelings were an inaccurate representation of what was actually happening, so therefore I shouldn't trust them.
The first aspect comprises the cognitive processes and representations that form the core of all thought.
A fundamental disagreement among proponents of CTM concerns the realization of personal-level representations (e.g., thoughts) and processes (e.g., inferences) in the brain.
Tye (2000) distinguishes them in terms of their functional roles and the intrinsic structure of their vehicles: thoughts are representations in a language-like medium, whereas experiences are image-like representations consisting of "symbol-filled arrays".
