Given the distinction between (A) having reason to think a certain proposition is true, and (B) having reason to induce belief in that proposition, taking steps to generate belief in a certain proposition may be the rational thing to do, even if that proposition lacks sufficient evidential support.
As we mentioned earlier, given the distinction between (A) having reason to think a certain proposition is true, and (B) having reason to induce a belief in that proposition, it may be that a particular proposition lacks sufficient evidential support, but that forming a belief in that proposition is the rational action to perform.
If we think of propositions as "structured entities looking something like the sentences which express them," as Kaplan invites us to do, we can think of directly referring terms as terms whose contribution to a proposition lacks the structure that characterizes the contribution of definite descriptions.
It's obvious that Clifford would do no wrong by swallowing the pills and bringing about a belief lacking adequate evidential support.[6] Moreover, since one is never irrational in doing one's moral duty, not only would Clifford not be immoral, he would not even be irrational in bringing about and maintaining belief in a proposition lacking adequate evidential support.
Peter Auriol argued that these propositions lack a truth-value; even God is aware of the future in a way which does not imply the contrary.
A different view was defended by Peter Auriol who argued that since these propositions lack a truth value, even God is aware of the future in a way which does not imply that future contingent propositions are true or false (Schabel 2000, 67 123).
In some cases, the propositions lacked any supporting or refuting data, so could not be supported in this study.
Having privacy means that others don't know certain private propositions; lacking privacy means that others do know certain private propositions (Blaauw 2013).
According to this strategy, one should not respond to the phenomena that prompt the gap by suggesting that certain propositions lack truth values; one should rather suggest that certain declarative sentences lack truth values, i.e., because they fail to express propositions at all.
In "Is truth only eternal or both eternal and without a beginning?" (1913) he argues for timeless bivalence against Kotarbiński's view that future contingent propositions lack a determinate truth-value.
