This restriction on what constitutes a fact is expressible via the following semantical principle: The principle entails that one cannot use the truth-functional connectives to construct facts, except where they are equivalent to term-logical connectives.
The crucial thing to note about this proposed counterexample is that it works only if the Closure Principle entails that the very same source of evidence that justifies S in believing that the animals are zebras must justify S in believing that they are not cleverly disguised mules.
This is entirely consistent with the view that, properly understood, the utility principle entails a presumption in favour of an equal distribution, unless there is compelling empirical evidence that utility would not be served by such a policy.
But the anomalism principle entails that there are no strict psychophysical laws.
Therefore, neither the interaction nor the cause-law principles (even together with the anomalism principle) entails causal closure.
The more counterexamples of apparently meaningful conditions that a principle entails lack meaning, the less justified the principle.
When ◊ is epistemic possibility, and the knowability principle is treated as a necessary thesis that is known, the knowability principle entails that, necessarily, there are no undecided statements.
But then his comprehension principle entails that there is an object corresponding to the condition of being a non-squared square, where that object instantiates the incompatible properties of being a square and being a non-square.
By taking A to be ⊥, and noting that ⊥ is refutable in F, it is easy to see that Reflection Principle entails the consistency statement Cons(F), i.e., ¬ProvF; hence it cannot be generally provable in the system.
The triple bottom line principle entails reporting of both economic performance of company and most importantly reporting on the environmental and social performance i.e., reporting of CSR activities.
