In this model, the equilibria on the theoretical plate are mutually conditional on all components being present in both the solution and the stationary phase.
Using this model the equilibria of the lumped water mass in the two electrodes are analyzed at various flow conditions of the stack to determine stable and unstable (liquid water growth) operating conditions.
In this sense, the equilibria in (ii)–(iv) are more fragile than those in (i).
So, we've got this several equilibria here; we've got at least three and we'll come back and talk about whether there are others in a minute.
For this Nash equilibria to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium, it's got to instruct Player 1 to choose down in the trivial sub-game and here it is.
From this, different equilibria in the path of convergence to the steady state can emerge, depending on the values of (left |mathcal {J}right |) and k.
We find that there are two Nash Equilibria this time, and fortunately, one of them is in the (Open,Open) scenario where both gain their maximum payoff.
But in this case, different equilibria appear when choosing different (epsilon -values.
As we will see in later sections, it is possible to maintain this understanding of equilibria in the case of game theory.
Since the elements of (mathcal {F}) constitute by definition the price-payment equilibria, this completes the proof.
