This split in consciousness requires alternating curiosity and caution, as you pass, in the instant, from being the voyeur to being the spectacle.
Carruthers (1998a,b, 2000) has argued to this effect based on his 'higher-order thought' theory, according to which, phenomenal consciousness requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one's own thoughts.[8] Such conceptualization requires, according to Carruthers, a theory of mind.
Whether facts about experience are indeed epistemically limited in this way is open to debate (Lycan 1996), but the claim that understanding consciousness requires special forms of knowing and access from the inside point of view is intuitively plausible and has a long history (Locke 1688).
Combined with his earlier arguments that consciousness requires the sort of self-awareness measured by the mirror test, this would imply that consciousness is unique to the great apes.
Since we don't know how the brains of mammals create consciousness, we have no grounds for assuming it's only the brains of mammals that do so – or even that consciousness requires a brain at all.
As she explores these themes she circles toward a central argument: the awakening of a wider ecological consciousness requires the acknowledgement and celebration of our reciprocal relationship with the world.
Consciousness requires implicit involvement of motor response throughout the organism, which entails that the scene perceived be pervaded by emotion.
A theory of consciousness requires an explanation of how and why some brain process causes consciousness replete with all the features we commonly experience.
That contradicts the assumption that phenomenal consciousness requires reference to qualia, from which it follows that such epiphenomenalistic worlds are not possible after all.
It is a descendent of Kant's claim examined in Section 1 that unified consciousness requires conceptual interconnectedness in the objects of consciousness; as he put it, "all appearances stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence stand in a transcendental affinity of which the empirical affinity is the mere consequence" (1781/1787, A113 114).
