The answerer began by asserting some proposition (a thesis: "position" or "acceptance").
The same strategy is deployed in the second antinomy, where the proponent of the thesis position argues for the necessity of some ultimately simple substance by showing the impossibility of infinite divisibility of substance, etc. Obviously, the success of the proofs depends on the legitimacy of the exclusive disjunction agreed to by both parties.
The thesis position argues for a necessary being, whereas the antithesis denies that there is any such being.
In this, the thesis positions are each concerned to bring the explanatory effort to a close, by arguing for ultimate or, as Kant says, "intelligible beginnings" (cf. A466/B494).
Thus, although the thesis positions satisfy reason's demand for the unconditioned, they do so by fleeing (however unwittingly) into an intelligible realm, by providing explanations that abstract from that which is or could be given in any spatio-temporal experience.
How do I find the academic self-confidence to really give a voice to my own thesis, my own position and stance?
It should be emphasized that Tempier's theses express positions that cannot be maintained in light of revealed truth; for this reason, each is followed by the qualification, "error".
It has also been emphasised by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that "Tempier's theses express positions that cannot be maintained in light of revealed truth, and for this reason are each followed by the qualification 'error'".
These final weeks have become really enjoyable, even with the pressure of the final deadline getting closer and closer, because I have given myself full permission to articulate my own thesis, my own position, my own voice.
Still in porous relation to another body, without clear borders or limits, the infant is propelled by the anarchic, heterogenous, rhythmic flow of drive energy "which has no thesis and no position" (Kristeva 1984, 26).
At the core of these criticisms is the thesis that the position involves a fallacy, the 'naturalistic fallacy', of supposing that goodness, which Moore takes to be the fundamental ethical value, can be defined in naturalistic terms, in terms, say, of pleasure or desire or the course of evolution.
