Thus, in the Metaphysics he claims that there are relational situations (such as Simmias's thinking about Socrates) in which substances are related not in virtue of a pair of accidents, but rather in virtue of a single accident possessed by just one of the substances.
Harman's ultimate position is not that there are no moral facts; indeed, he explicitly asserts "there is empirical evidence that there are (relational) moral facts" (1977: 132).
The attempt to make this precise splinters OSR into different forms (three of these are discussed in Ainsworth (2010) and he argues against two of them), and all of the following claims have been advocated by some defenders of OSR at some time: (1) Eliminativism: there are no individuals (but there is relational structure) This view is associated with French and Ladyman.
Medieval philosophers often say that, even if there are relational situations involving only a single accident, nonetheless these situations must be conceived as if they involved a pair, one belonging to each of the related things (cf., e.g., Aquinas, De potentia q. 1, a. 1, ad 10).
Then there are relational tools that Buddhism has for dealing with others, dealing with enemies, dealing with difficult people.
Among the intentional phenomena there are relations like love and hate which do not have propositional content; and there are also non-relational states expressed by the so-called "intensional transitive" verbs like seek, fear, expect (see the entry on intensional transitive verbs).
(2) There are relations (or relational facts) that do not supervene on the intrinsic and spatio-temporal properties of their relata.
These factors were relational.
What there are, instead, are relational properties: blue-for-perceiver A-in-circumstances C1, red-for-perceiver B-in-circumstances C2, yellow-for-perceiver D-in-circumstances C3, and so on.
Since the relevant resemblances are relational, there is no requirement that representations share properties other than abstract relational properties with their representeds.
