That is, for an actualist, it is a theorem of SQML that it is necessary that everything necessarily exists, that anything that there could have been already exists necessarily.
Assume that if God exists, then this is a best possible world.[8] In that case, if God exists, there could not be an evil unless it were necessary for some greater good, in which case any state of affairs containing evil incompatible with there being a maximally good world is impossible.
Thus, the intuition that there could have been something that does not actually exist is understood as the claim that there are non-concrete things that could have been concrete: ∃x ¬C!x ∧ ◇C!x).
While no inventory exists of brownfield sites in the state, the Department of Environmental Conservation said there could potentially be thousands.
Intuitively, not only could there have been fewer things, there could have been more things or, more generally, things other than those that actually exist.
Note that this is not merely to say that there could have been Aliens, or that there could have been people other than those who actually exist.
While respondents who were reincarcerated were almost certainly rearrested, there could exist respondents who were rearrested but not reincarcerated.
Even if every existing infinite mode necessarily exists, could there have been other infinite modes as well?
Thus, this second objection is based on an assumption that seems to be impossible, namely, that if God exists there could exist another omnipotent agent who is morally imperfect and who is therefore more powerful than God.
There's nothing that exists on me.
That life could exist there, that's the exciting thing.
