(Recall, the relativist claims that it is the same proposition that is true at one time and false at another and so nothing intrinsic to the proposition alters; it must, then, be the same bundle of properties that is the object constituent in both cases).
Each must complement the other and underscore the same proposition: that the applicant is an individual of extraordinary ability in his or her field of endeavor.
(The view also predicts that all true sentences of mathematics express the same (necessary) proposition, that any two necessarily equivalent sentences express the same proposition, that the conjunction of any sentence S with a necessarily true sentence expresses the same proposition as S, and so on).
On referentialist principles, the two statements express the same proposition, the one that is true in all worlds in which Venus (the planet that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are two names for) is visible in the eastern sky.
Either way, we can say that, e.g., the English sentence 'Snow is white' and the German sentence 'Schnee ist weiss' express the same proposition, namely, the proposition that snow is white.
However, note that B1N*(A) is not necessarily the same proposition as K*N(A), that is, even if A is common 1-belief, A can fail to be common knowledge.
If two proofs prove the same proposition, says Wittgenstein, this means that "both demonstrate it as a suitable instrument for the same purpose," which "is an allusion to something outside mathematics" (RFM VII, §10, 1941; italics added).
By contrast, the sentence with hai will produce the same proposition as well as another entailment that "Laowang is asleep at times that are earlier than 8 o'clock".
And one cannot analyze it in terms of believing-true a sentence that expressing the same proposition or worse still believing the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence, on pains of reverting to the thesis of propositionalism that the theory was designed to avoid.
If we get under certain circumstances the impression that one and the same proposition can sometimes be true and sometimes be false, this is merely due to the fact that we do not talk about a proposition but about an ambiguous linguistic chain of words that expresses two or even more propositions, some of which can be true and others false (WL II, 7).
SYN was a word collocating with a word that was in the same proposition as the choice words.
