Following the general Renaissance custom, Locke defined an idea as a mental entity: "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks".
Following the general Renaissance custom, Locke defined an idea as a mental entity: "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". But whereas for Descartes and the entire rationalist school the certainty of ideas had been a function of their self-evidence i.e., of their clarity and diself-evidence iLocke their validity depended expressly on the mode and manner of their origin.e
The term 'idea,' Locke tells us "…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a man thinks" (Essay I, 1, 8, p. 47).
But that objects of the understanding cannot be objects of taste seems a guiding assumption of much of the rest of the Enquiry: consider, for example, Burke's claim that it is only as an object of the imagination, and specifically not as an object of the understanding, that God can be found sublime (Burke 1990, 62).
In the 1759 addition to A Philosophical Enquiry (the "Introduction on Taste") Burke allows that objects of the understanding constitute "a very considerable part of what are considered objects of Taste" (Burke 1990, 22).
Moreover, how far should we distinguish between so-called formal concepts (or acts of mind) and objective concepts (whatever it is that is the object of the act of understanding)?
In each sense, the divine light acts not on us but on the objects of our understanding.
It is explained that the object of the book is to develop intuitive mathematical understanding rather than to give rigorous development of the topics considered.
Achieving effective change in an organisation may require a transformation in understanding or 'expansion' of the object of the activity.
But the diversity of the objects of an act of understanding need not diversify the act itself (as when understanding the Pythagorean theorem we understand both squares and triangles).
