Sentence examples for the merely possible from inspiring English sources

"You're saying, 'In every possible world, everything is physical.' " In Sentence 2, "Everything is necessarily physical," "necessarily" has a narrower scope: it ignores the merely possible and attends only to what actually exists.

But for events which are unrepeatable or seldom repeatable, even the merely possible suitable reference classes will be small.

In the latter view, it is the locus of becoming, the dividing line between the merely possible future and the actual past-plus-present.

Nor would abstractionism face the technical challenges that fictionalism faces, since all the merely possible worlds would in fact exist; there would be no problem of switching back and forth between fictional and literal discourse.

The merely possible atomic states of affairs are the recombinations of particulars and universals, i.e. those combinations which do not actually occur, like Aristotle's being a general.[28] Possible worlds are, for Armstrong, conjunctions of possible atomic states of affairs (1989, 47, 48).[29] Armstrong's combinatorialism is actualist in the sense that everything that exists actually exists.

Of course, this objection may itself fail if we are convinced that such an unyielding form of actualism cannot be correct – if, that is, whether actualist or not we are convinced that claims about the merely possible can be both true and cogent.

They are rather supposed to be merely possible events: experiences which are indistinguishable for the subject from a genuine perception of an object.

In this kind of video game, often described as an "open world" game, there is a difference between action that is required by the game in the course of the narrative and the action that is merely possible within the bounds the game; this further complicates the question of whether the capacity for some types of play should be removed.

The alternatives included a more moderate realism propounded by the American philosopher Robert Stalnaker which denies Lewis's homogeneity thesis (the claim that merely possible worlds are entities of the same kind as the actual world), as well as fictionalism, the view that possible-world theory is literally false but useful.

The Principle restricted to merely possible substances follows from Leibniz's identification of substances with complete concepts.

In the case of merely possible individuals, however, their being is contained solely in the divine mind.