Sentence examples for the expressions in question from inspiring English sources

But none of the accounts in the literature seemed to explain satisfactorily precisely what the "expressions" in question were, nor the nature of the parallel between them and how it supported an inference.

But the contextualist may reply that any unpleasantness or feeling of unfamiliarity attending such claims derives from our failing to be fully aware of the context-sensitivity of the expressions in question.

And descriptive naturalists about morality have pointed out that the openness of Moore's question to competent speakers does not rule out the possibility of securing the identity of a moral property with a naturalistic property through empirical discoveries that do not rely on the expressions in question having the same meaning (Boyd 1988).

Such functions from possible worlds to extensions of the appropriate sort are often called intensions of the expressions in question, and the term 'intension' shall be used this way throughout the present work.[5] Now since most think that the extensions of sentences are truth values, as indicated above, the intension of a sentence is a function from possible worlds to truth values.

In other words, semantic nonfactualism about moral terms entails that questions of the sort highlighted by Moore could not be closed by any amount of competence with the expressions used to ask them because the expressions in question are not in fact equivalent.

A related mistake is to assume that the two readings correspond to two irreducible meanings of the expression in question, rather than to the form of the sentence in which the expression is contained.

For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question.

I can refer to such things as furze (gorse) and filberts (hazelnuts) even if the descriptive content I associate with the expression in question is not 'uniquely satisfied' by such things — indeed, even if the content in question is satisfied by (say) walnuts or cashews.

The resulting epistemic 1-intensions will reflect a highly abstract aspect of the subject's initial understanding of her own words: that pattern of naïve understanding that suffices to justify all ideally rational judgments about apriori coherence involving the expression in question.

The semantic arguments differ in that they are presented in the formal mode, concerning the linguistic expressions in question.

But we can bypass this question altogether if we are constructing a new system from the bottom up; in that case we shall make no further use of the sign A – we shall only use B. We have introduced the sign B to take the place of the complex expression in question by arbitrary fiat and in this way we have conferred a sense on it.