However bizarre the explanation, in terms of official international observation that seems to be that.
First, the explanation in terms of emotional goods underdetermines the institution to be supported: other relationships, such as friendships, embody emotional goods.
The explanation in terms of parts may fail to explain why these parts exist rather than others, why they exist rather than not, or why the parts are arranged as they are.
"Hard" models involve abstract concepts, and the insistence on explanations in terms of universal laws– with formal, general, timeless, context-free, and value-neutral arguments.
We identify the underlying mechanistic explanations in terms of runoff generation and connectivity of saturated areas that determine the sensitivity of flood response to the spatio-temporal variability of rainfall.
Nevertheless, we are positively surprised at the level of coherence in regard to the listener ratings and their explanations in terms of the acoustic features; in spite of the limitations we imposed on the setting using a random splicing method, and the fact that we tested a large number of clusters.
The main strategy here is usually to generalize the argument outlined above: explanations in terms of representational mental states are costly and clumsy; there is no generally accepted account of mental representation; and there is reason to think that we will, eventually, be able to explain all kinds of agency without the ascription of representational mental states.
That suggests that for the Macdonalds there needs to be an account of reason explanations in terms of the nomological properties that mental events instance in order for reasons explanations to be causal explanations precisely what Campbell claims is ruled out by Davidson's mental anomalism.
An interesting counterexample to explanations in terms of the "dying brain" is found in the NDEs experienced by mountain climbers in the midst of what they expected to be fatal falls (Heim 1892); it is hardly credible that these experiences can be reduced to either drugs or oxygen deprivation.
But explanations of these kinds do not necessarily compete with explanations in terms of the agent's reasons (see Smith 1998).
