Further, Kant explicitly argues that the properly aesthetic pleasure in beautiful objects enters into combination with interests, also properly so called, in the existence of those objects.
Hence, the existence of a thought does not depend on the existence of the objects it purports to represent.
One example are traditional intuitionist views, which affirm the existence of mathematical objects but maintain that these objects depend on or are constituted by mathematicians and their activities.4 Some further examples of views that are anti-nominalist without being platonist will be discussed in Section 5.2.
Assuming that the modal-structural translation scheme works for set theory, modal structuralists need not explain how we can have knowledge of the existence of mathematical objects, relations or structures given the lack of commitment to these entities.
Most notably, the dominant kinds view recognizes the existence of ordinary objects like statues and lumps of clay and allows for these objects to gain and lose parts.
Interestingly, Jayarāśi never links these two issues, precisely because, it seems, he admitted the existence of macroscopic objects of our experience (i.e., composite wholes) whereas he rejected the existence of universals.
To explain reality, Ortega continued, the natural sciences, in their concern with the existence of objects in natural phenomena, aim at discovering the general concepts or the natural laws under which these objects may be subsumes.
That is, what one immediately perceives is the physical object itself (or a part of it); thus there is no problem about inferring the existence of such objects from the contents of one's perception.
So to admit the existence of holes is to admit the existence of immaterial objects!
