While it is fairly easy to find real-life correspondence theorists committing themselves to the view that each truth corresponds to exactly one fact (at least by implication, talking about the corresponding fact), it is difficult to find real-life correspondence theorists committing themselves to the view that only one truth can correspond to a given fact (but see Moore 1910-11, p. 256).
"Given the broad-based nature of the disinflation and the corresponding fact that many countries are easing monetary policy at the same time, dampening the downward pressure that monetary policy easing exerts on the exchange rate, monetary policy stimulus on its own may not be sufficient to keep medium-term inflation expectations anchored at central bank targets.
What are the constituents of the corresponding fact?
Since the proposition "R a, b)" is affirmative, and the corresponding fact is negative, "R a, b)" is false, and, equivalently, its negation "not-R a, b)" is true.
Some Medieval philosophers supposed that the fact that true propositions are of the two sorts "necessarily true" and "contingently true" (and the corresponding fact about false propositions) showed that there were two "modes" in which a proposition could be true (or false): the mode of contingency and the mode of necessity hence the term 'modality'modality
Theory F(A -Cond is supplemented by the principle A -Condng to whish there isupplementedespondence C bytheen the facts and the principleons which caccordinge, such toat for any such proposition p and any which, p is thereat that world isf the corresponding fact exists in that world, which entails P1.
Similarly, moderate but statistically significant correlations (r =.30 and higher) were observed between QL-I total score in both doctor and patient versions as well as between QL-I items and the corresponding FACT-G subscales (QL-I d and QL-I p Activity, Daily Living and Health and FWB; QL-I d and QL-I p Support and SFW), (Table 5).
The aim is to show how the correspondence relation is generated from underlying relations between the ultimate constituents of truthbearers, on the one hand, and the ultimate constituents of their corresponding facts, on the other.
If moral facts are non-natural facts, as intuitionists maintain, and non-natural properties lack causal powers, then moral intuitions cannot be caused by the corresponding moral facts, as, e.g., certain perceptual seemings are caused by certain natural facts.
