Anyone focused on valuation missed that phenomenal performance.
Of course, that phenomenal Bafta triumph may have done it more harm than good.
Representationalists assert that phenomenal character depends on content.
We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines.
So-called "intentionalists" are philosophers who think that phenomenal consciousness can really be explained by intentionality because they think that phenomenal states are intentional states.
Significantly, all neo-Russellians join ranks in rejecting Russell's claim that phenomenal properties are neutral.
A second option is to reject the claim that phenomenal contents are essentially dynamic.
Representationalism (or intentionalism) is the thesis that phenomenal properties are determined by representational properties.
Other neo-Russellians concede that phenomenal properties are basic but deny that they are neutral.
He also argues that phenomenal concepts are 'recognitional', in contrast to physical concepts, which are 'theoretical'theoretical
The representationalist thesis is often formulated as the claim that phenomenal properties are representational or intentional.
