In the rest of this article, I will discuss respect and self-respect using Darwall's term "recognition respect," Hudson's term "evaluative respect," and Feinberg's "reverential respect" (the last for the valuing feeling that is motivational without being deliberative), specifying the valuing dimensions as necessary.
We use the term evaluative studies to describe medical education articles describing one or more interventions and including at least one evaluative component.
(Frankfurt 1988c)[1] According to another story, her point of view is constituted by her (contemporaneous or long-term) evaluative judgments regarding which actions are (most) worth performing.
He also blurs descriptive terms into evaluative ones and, on occasion, falls back on such questions as: "Aren't these exactly the best words in the best order?" More generally, someone who'd never read a novel would come away from Wood's criticism with little awareness that writers tell stories as well as brood over characters "like God over the face of the waters".
In contrast to teleological theories, which seek to account for deontic categories in terms of evaluative ones, Fitting Attitudes accounts aspire to account for evaluative categories — like good simpliciter, good for, and attributive good — in terms of the deontic.
According to teleological views, of which classical consequentialism and universalizable egoism are classic examples, deontic categories are posterior to and to be explained in terms of evaluative categories like good and good for.
Fitting attitude (FA) theories propose to analyze value, or some limited range of values, in terms of evaluative attitudes endorsed as fitting or, alternatively, as appropriate, correct, merited, proper, rational, or warranted.
In terms of evaluative self-organisation, we predicted that social anxiety would be associated with more negative compartmentalisation, and although this did appear to be the case when we looked at the correlations, the picture was much more complicated in the regression.
These considerations suggest that one aspect of the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is best understood as a debate about whether knowledge and justification can be understood in naturalistically acceptable causal and reliabilist terms or must be understood in terms of naturalistically suspect evaluative terms.
This is counterintuitive if 'work' is an evaluative term, but it is not obvious that this is the case.
A typical example of the second kind of case, on the other hand, would be one in which the agent is actually using the evaluative term "good" or "ought" only in what Hare calls an "inverted-commas" sense (Hare 1952, p. 120; pp. 124 6; pp. 164 5; pp. 167 171).
