Pay attention to reality: the taste of food, the pleasure of dancing or walking or playing sports, the experiences that thrill you or fill you with satisfaction when you accomplish goals.
Although Addison maintains that the pleasures of taste are pleasures of the imagination, his explanations as to why certain objects of imagination please are not particularly materialist.
While he continues to maintain that in pure judgments of taste our pleasure is in the unity of the form of the object alone, he quickly recognizes that there are a variety of impure forms of beauty where what we respond to with the free play of our imagination and understanding is harmony between an object's perceptible form and its matter, its content, or even its purpose.
Addison's fundamental idea is that the pleasures of taste are pleasures of the imagination.
The expansion presumably responds to a problem arising from the application Addison's fundamental idea the idea that the pleasures of taste are pleasures of visual representation to objects that do not present themselves visually, such as literary and musical works.
No joy of growth, no thrill of overcoming challenges, no way to taste the pleasure of victory over daunting obstacles.
It does not stun children with spectacle but fires their imaginations and gives them a savory taste of the sensory pleasures of live entertainment without forcing too much unsettling clown intimacy on the adults in the audience.
First, he asserts that in "pure" judgments of taste our pleasure in beauty is a response only to the perceptible form of an object, not to any matter or content it may have—for example, in pictorial arts, "the drawing is what is essential," while the "colors that illuminate the outline…can…enliven the object in itself for sensation, but cannot make it…beautiful" (CPJ, §14, 5 225).
What this means is that the judgment of taste is based on a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.
Kant describes the judgment of taste as "based on" a feeling of pleasure, and as claiming that everyone ought to share the subject's feeling of pleasure, or, as he puts it, as claiming the "universal communicability" of the pleasure.
