Sentence examples for substantive conceptions from inspiring English sources

And if enthusiasts of the rule of law place enough emphasis on procedural justice, this can reduce the likelihood that more substantive conceptions of justice will have success.

This breadth is intended to achieve neutrality between competing substantive conceptions of the good; for example, Rawls' "social primary goods," such as income and wealth, were chosen for their utility in promoting widely differing conceptions.

The problems posed by the existence of individuals with severe disabilities might suggest an objection against formal and substantive conceptions of equality of opportunity or at least raise doubts about their ethical importance.

It seems false that we can respect persons and at the same time tell them to leave their fundamental commitments behind in public discourse, and it seems false also that some purely rational but still action-guiding component can be separated off from these competing substantive conceptions of the good (see Wolterstorff, "An Engagement with Rorty").

Rawls thought it important that substantive conceptions of the good life were left behind in moving to the Original Position, because he was attempting to provide an account of justice that people with competing visions of the good could agree to in a pluralist society.

The fact that both formal and substantive conceptions of equality of opportunity and the rival level playing field conception as well are proposed as ancillary requirements or supplements to a theory of justified social hierarchy poses a general issue concerning their justification.

The assumption is that the intuitions one is disposed to have in virtue of possessing the concept of law will be fertile enough to constitute a particular substantive conception of what the law is and how it functions.

The aim of a theory of law, then, would be to systematize these pre-theoretic judgments about the concept of law in order to provide an account of some substantive conception of law.

Freedom unconstrained by a substantive conception of that which makes life worthwhile is a recipe for meaninglessness.

I suggest that the unique political dynamics of the European Union have prodded the ECJ closer toward a more substantive conception of constitutional equality.

The second part of the book endorses the idea that there is such a thing as a universal human nature, and suggests that this idea is central to any substantive conception of human rights.