If males are a substance kind, then everything is either male or not-male, with no middle-ground.
We have seen that Locke's particular substances are kinds of things, and because they are kinds they correspond to Aristotle's secondary substances.
Locke's 'particular substances' are kinds which are individuated conventionally, and so are not real substantial kinds, by Aristotelian standards.
He added, "Without taking any substance, that kind of training can cause death".
(Just before the fight, Margarito had been caught with a foreign substance — a kind of plaster, it turned out — concealed in his hand wraps).
The humor was his style, not his substance, a kind of athletic jauntiness: He loved how great athletes could make excellence look nonchalant, and he strove for the same effect on the page.
This is the conception according to which substances are kinds of stuff.
Let us assume for the purposes of this example that the solid sphere is a substance, a kind of basic, ontologically independent entity (see section 6.3 for further discussion).
It considers, for example, concepts such as identity, causation, substance, and kind, that seem to be presupposed by any form of inquiry; and it attempts to determine what there is at the most general level.
Many, such as Descartes, create a chasm between mind and body by taking them to be separate substances of kinds that separable from one another and which therefore lack the necessary connection which is the core of causation on the substance philosophy.
