Sentence examples for strength of reason from inspiring English sources

Why should perfection or reality and strength of reason to exist correspond to possessing a greater number of attributes?

If anything, the strength of reason as a competing argument to Stein's pseudoscientific drivel is at risk now.

Or, to take another example, there may be a large difference in the strength of reasons to save each of two beings from death, but this difference may have little to do with the moral status of the beings.

Second, it is important, methodologically speaking, not to infer moral status (full or otherwise) simply from the degree of wrongness or badness of an act, from the existence of rights, or from the strength of reasons in favor of the act (including omissions).

But this is not itself evidence of a higher moral status of the human being: the difference in the strength of reasons is fully explained by the vast difference in the benefits of aid in the two cases, and is fully compatible with the claim that the human and the rabbit have the same moral status.

Some transmission principles say that "oughts" transmit from end to means, others say that the full force of the reason for the end transmits to the means, others say that the strength of the reason for the end that transmits to the means is proportional to other factors, and others, like Raz's Facilitative Principle, say only that some reason for the end transmits to the means.

Another way to capture degrees of moral status is to vary not the strength of the reasons but which reasons apply.

FMS is about the strength of the reason to aid and not about what type of aid to give.

These variations suggest that the reasons for non-participation may be different between social groups and/or that the strength of such reasons might differ.

One way to capture degrees of moral status is to vary the strength of the reasons outlined in section 2 (and hence also the degree of wrongness involved in acting against these reasons – see DeGrazia 2008).

Nevertheless, those are the sorts of cases in which the strength of retributivist reasons to punish are mostly likely to make a difference.