Sentence examples for states of believing from inspiring English sources

(In this paragraph, and in most of the rest of section 4, we use 'belief' for events or states of believing propositions, rather than for propositions that are believed. We also use 'desire'intention'on', and 'attitude' similarly).

(In this paragraph, and for most of the rest of section 4, we use 'belief' as a term for events or states of believing propositions, rather than for propositions that are believed. We use 'desire'intention'on', and 'attitude' similarly).

A realist about mental states or conscious experiences is one who holds that our world contains creatures who are sometimes in states of believing, desiring, remembering, perceiving, etc. and that the existence and nature of such states in no way contingent on our recognition of them.

Second, it is inconsistent with the plausible intuition that it is possible for two human beings to be in the same mental state (such as the state of believing that the king of France is bald) and yet not be in the same neurophysiological state.

So the state of believing truly is better than the state of believing falsely.

Consider the state of believing that p (or the activity of judging that p).

This credal state is the state of believing the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about Q.

For example, the total brain-state realization of the state of pain may simply be a subset of the total brain-state realization of the state of believing that one is in pain.

Rather, the cognitive state of believing h&r&w is often deemed to be a good state to be in if the proposition is true, not good if it is false.

In the case of empirical knowledge we have a subject in the psychological state of believing that something is true of the world; his belief has a propositional object as its content as Bradley would call it.

The state (the activity) is not, strictly speaking, true or false; rather, what is true or false is its content, the proposition that p. Nevertheless, on the present view, it is the state of believing that p that corresponds or fails to correspond to a fact.