Second, section 102.168 5) provides: "A statement of the grounds of contest may not be rejected, nor the proceedings dismissed, by the court for any want of form if the grounds of contest provided in the statement are sufficient to clearly inform the defendant of the particular proceeding or cause for which the nomination or election is contested".
Some courthouses may use two forms: a Statement of Legal Grounds and the petition itself.
This makes his statement questionable on grounds of context more than a statistic which is literally correct but contextually irrelevant and misleading.
Assuming that grounding is unitary (we can remain neutral on how grounding might be related to metaphysical relations like material constitution and realization), what is the logical form of grounding statements?
For the purposes of this entry we will assume that grounding is a relation between facts, that the logical form of grounding statements is $[p]$ is grounded in Δ, and that $[p]$ is grounded in Δ only if $[p]$ and the Δs obtain (i.e., the grounding relation is factive).
It seems that there are cases in which a single fact is grounded in a plurality of facts (e.g., $[p \mathbin q]$ (the fact that $p \mathbin q$) is grounded in $[p], [q]$), so we can think of the logical form of grounding statements on the predicate view as follows: $[p]$ is grounded in Δ, where Δ is a plurality of facts.
AP says that while the rebels officially deny responsibility, "the denials are increasingly challenged by accounts of residents, the observations of journalists on the ground, and the statements of one rebel official".
One suggestion is to highlight the interesting contradiction that arose from finding no ticks in the ground CDC light traps (CDC-LTs) despite the statement that "ground populations of A. tapirellum are quite abundant" during the sampling period.
Bogdan and Biklen (1998) define grounded theory as deriving universal statements of general social processes.
All of the statements of the logic of collective action above are grounded in an assumption of the self-interested incentives of the actors.
Moreover, the Mādhyamika will reject the classic correspondence theory of truth, according to which the truth of a statement is grounded in a similarity of structure between a statement and the bit of the world it refers to.
