Exact(4)
Moreover, as Leibniz argued, "In saying… that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary?
Some scholars have argued that one or the other of these two more metaphysical standards represents Leibniz's settled view on the true standard of goodness [Gale, for example].
That is to say, More wished to refute the theological position that whatever God decrees to be good is good, in favour of the alternative theological position, that God wills what is good (and he does so necessarily because He himself conforms to an absolute standard of goodness).
Thus, there are creatures with bodies and creatures without, creatures with freedom and intelligence and creatures without, creatures with sentience and creatures without, etc. [See, for example, MP pp. 75 6 and 138 (G VII 303 4 and 310).] In some texts, however, Leibniz frames the standard of goodness in what some have taken to be a third distinct way.
Similar(56)
By having reasonable standards of goodness, we can be happy and good, and thus be able to protect ourselves from the people who hurt us.
If we set ourselves impossible standards of goodness, we suffer.
But elsewhere, following his kinsman Matthew Arnold, he defends timeless standards of "goodness, beauty, wisdom and knowledge", which he takes to be "everywhere and in all kinds of society broadly the same".Finally Huxley identifies himself as a "life-worshipper", though this is too Nietzschean a label for what amounts to a rather tepid Epicureanism.
[See Theodicy 129 (H 192 3; G VI 182).] In any event, Leibniz holds that we are simply unable to know how changing certain events would change the world's capacity to meet the standards of goodness described in (2) and (3).
Equally important is that they have built a community and defined it by the standards of goodness.
Instead of putting forward an ideal, the standard of moral goodness is a comparative standard: with respect to cases of appropriate comparison, the standard of moral goodness tells one how the two items being compared — whether desires, traits of character, actions — are ordered with respect to one another.
After all, whatever standard of moral goodness that one puts forward as the ideal, it must be a standard that is possible for agents to meet, for 'ought' — at least, the moral 'ought' — implies 'can.' But one might claim that the standard for moral goodness is not really like that.
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Since I tried Ludwig back in 2017, I have been constantly using it in both editing and translation. Ever since, I suggest it to my translators at ProSciEditing.

Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
CEO of Professional Science Editing for Scientists @ prosciediting.com