Standard assertions are not epistemically qualified or 'guarded' (e.g., I am pretty (very) sure that p), but they are the expression of the corresponding all-out (or full) belief (see Toulmin 1958, 85; also, Coady 1992; Fricker 1995, 2004; Graham 1997; Goldberg 2001; Lackey 2008, especially Ch.1; Cullison 2010).
DeRose argued from the knowledge norm and the varying standards for assertion as premises, to the conclusion that epistemic contextualism is true (2002: 182).
In reality, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration retains full authority to increase fuel economy standards, and assertions that the resolution undercuts government authority ignore the fact that such authority comes only with the consent of the people.
Various commentators over the years have used her assertions against her (there is more evidence supporting them than contradicting them), either to claim that she lied or to deny her skills as a literary artist, but claiming to be merely reporting a true story is a standard novelist's assertion.
Our decision to use DCMI Metadata Terms is motivated by the fact that, today, it is the de facto standard for the assertion of metadata on the Web [34].
Stanley also criticizes DeRose, despite accepting that the standards of proper assertion vary between contexts.
According to Stanley, the varying standards of proper assertion depends on the context dependence of 'certain', not on any context dependence of 'know' (which Stanley rejects).
Some authors who note that standards of proper assertion appears to vary between context suggest that there is not a single norm with a contextual parameter, but rather that different norms apply in different contexts, still governing one and the same speech act type, assertion.
One might wish to do this, for example, if one thought that paradigmatic story-telling consisted of utterances that were not truth-apt (not anyway through the same mechanism as ordinary utterances), while claims about, say, ideal gases were better construed as standard sorts of assertions that were literally false.
Independent of the specification of such a standard, S's u assertion lacks a truth-value much as, by comparison, indexical expressions such as "The barn is nearby" do not get a truth-value independent of contextual facts about the context of use (i.e. the context in which the utterance is made).
