1. Yet another way to refer to this same basic idea is to speak of objects with which we are acquainted (or, sometimes, directly acquainted).
Rather, it involves affirming simply that our talk is indeed talk exclusively of objects that we may speak of objects in the plural as well as in the singular, and that plural talk of objects is talk of the very same category of items as is talk of objects in the singular.
To see the tension between these conceptions, note that we often speak of fictional objects as the creations of story-tellers or of the human mind more generally.
Consequently, and not accidentally, it is quite common in the current literature both for and against dialetheism to straightforwardly speak of inconsistent objects, states of affairs, and entire inconsistent worlds.
Aristotle mentions it explicitly as an aporia or difficulty that must be resolved (On Memory and Recollection 1, 450a25 ff).. Certain Stoics speak of certain objects as immanent, as literally present, "in thought" (what they call ennoêmata), while later thinkers use the phrase "existing in mere thoughts alone" (en psilais epinoiais monais) to characterize merely intentional objects.
Pace Berkeley, it is not unintelligible to speak of an object one is directly aware of having the same shape as an object one cannot be directly aware of.
Amusement at the wrong things may seem to us to show corruption of mind, cruelty, or bad taste; and when it does so, we speak of the object as not truly amusing, and feel that we have reason on our side.
I say 'implicit rationale', because it seems no more natural to speak of an object as being 'wholly present at all temporal points of its existence' than it is to say that it has objects as its temporal parts.
(NB, 50) {§6.5} Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infintely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all these by name when I speak of that object.
Tugendhat tells us that "The fundamental question of ontology is: what is being as being?", and he reformulates this question as the question of "what it means to speak of an object".
Sakya Paṇḍita adopts, phenomenologically speaking, a view that is quite similar to the one he criticizes: while his opponents speak of a "generic object appearing to conceptual thought," Sakya Paṇḍita accepts that there is the emergence of an "image" or "reflection" (Tib. gzugs brnyan, Skt. pratibimba/pratibhā) in conceptual thought.
